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  This  paper  proposes  an  original  formal  framework  to  analyze  institutional 
evolution.  Institutions  have  formal  (F)  and  informal  (N)  aspects  that  may  evolve  at 
different  paces,  although  eventually  converging  towards  each  other  through  an 
dynamic interactive process. N evolves with capital accumulation, as in learning by 
doing, and F is optimally chosen by the government who maximizes output given the 
social and political costs of changing F. As transaction-cost-reducing mechanisms, F 
and  N  together  define  the  production  technology  and  affect  the  income  level.  As 
consistent with the evidence, calibrations of the model reveal that optimum F exhibits a 
punctuated equilibra.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Institutions are commonly accepted rules of the game and enforcement mechanisms 
that  arise  from  repeated  human  interactions.  This  study  offers  a  formal  model  of 
institutional  evolution  that  accommodates  two  prominent  approaches  of  institutional 
economics:  transaction  cost  and  collective  action  theories.  The  former  of  these 
approaches  has  been  pioneered  by  Coase  (1960)  and  been  developed  as  New 
Institutional  Economics  (NIE)  by  Williamson  (1985)  and  North  (1990),  whereas  the 
latter is due to Olson (1965 and 1982). The two approaches can be viewed as strongly 
complementary to each other in understanding the nature of institutional frameworks 
and factors that lead to their change.  
The transaction cost approach to institutional change posits that changes in the 
proportionality of productive factors affect relative prices, preferences and incentives, 
and hence greatly influence the nature of preferred institutional arrangements; in other 
words, institutions emerge and change as a result of a process of adapting to each 
other  and  to  changing  economic  structure.  Collective  action  theory  focuses  on  the 
circumstances  that  lead  powerful  interest  groups  to  form  and  become  effective
1  in 
facilitating  institutional  change  through  affecting  government’s  decisions.  While 
transaction cost theory provides a rather static view of institutional choice, collective 
action theory emphasizes the dynamics of institutional change.
2   
Combining  the  two  approaches  provides  an  appropriate  framework  for 
understanding the process of institutional evolution. The adaptive institutional change 
approach of NIE, and the dynamic interaction between political power structure and the 
level of economic development explained by collective action theory both point at the   3 
interdependence  between  economic  development  and  institutional  change.  Efficient 
institutional change may occur when social cost of maintaining status-quo exceeds the 
cost  of  changing  existing  production  relations,  or  when  social  benefits  of  change 
exceed its social costs. Institutional change is usually slow and inefficient, however, as 
explained by collective action theory via the development of narrow interest groups into 
the  beneficiaries  of  the  status-quo.  While  continual  technological  accumulation  and 
demographic  changes  lead  to  small  but  continuous  changes  in  social  norms,  their 
combined effect may start to exert pressure for a change in the legal framework that 
defines production relations. This occurs as the amount of change in norms reach a 
threshold  where  the  existing  formal  institution(s)  become  severely  obstructive  for 
production.  In  this  regard,  Pejovich
  (1998)  summarizes  the  model  of  institutional 
evolution as follows: 
.. When new formal rules conflict with the prevailing informal rules, the incentive 
they create will raise transaction costs and reduce the production of wealth in 
the community (p.2). 
 
The decision  to change  formal  institutions hence crucially depends on  the political-
power structure, which is, in turn, closely connected with economic structure. Political 
and economic crises that destroy the existing power-balances therefore often generate 
a great impetus for major institutional reforms.
3  
In  view  of  the  foregoing,  modeling  institutional  evolution  should  distinguish 
between two key attributes of production technology: i) a set of informal rules (N) that 
changes slowly and is embedded in, or formed by, cultural or structural characteristics 
of a society; and ii) a set of formal rules (F) that define the organizational or contractual 
characteristics of production. As production relations (N) evolve with the accumulation 
of factors of production, laws and regulations that organize those production relations 
(F) may usually lag behind. Olson argues that such institutional sclerosis can explain 
the low growth rates observed in some stable democracies. By receiving demands for,   4 
or against, institutional change, the government, or the social planner, becomes the 
agent that is instrumental in materializing them.  
Due to lack of expertise, or based on the advice from international organizations  
that are not familiar with particular a country’s socio-economic characteristics, many 
developing countries may adopt legislation (F) based on the experiences of developed 
countries, called best-practice institutions. These countries may, however, continue to 
follow their own traditional ways of doing business when they are inconsistent with 
those  legislations.  For  example,  many  transition  economies  adopted  laws  that  are 
copied  from  developed  countries  before  achieving  sufficiently  developed  domestic 
market mechanisms or expertise that would make them effective. Conflicts of F with the 
existing  informal  rules/norms  and  enforcement  mechanisms  (N)  therefore  often  led 
such reforms to be dysfunctional.  
Casson  et  al.  (2010)  point  out  the  importance  of  explicitly  incorporating  the 
interaction between N and F into the studies of development. Though there have been 
recent attempts to model institutional change, the complexity of the dynamics involving 
its political and economic aspects leads these models to focus on specific aspects of 
institutional evolution. Acemoglu (2006) elaborates a model of political economy for a 
society defined by ex-ante characterizations of middle class, workers and the elite, who 
initially hold all the political power. He argues that policy inefficiency results under both 
the factor price manipulation and, though to a lesser extent, the revenue extraction 
incentives of the elite; a potential switch of political power towards the middle class also 
results in inefficient policy choices. Inefficient institutions result from the elite’s desire to 
maintain  these  policies.  Utilizing  the  implementation-theory  framework  to  combine 
social  choice  with  institutional  economics,  Yao  (2004)  also  studies  institutional 
efficiency.  He  finds  that  institutional  change  is  sensitive  to  income  distribution  and 
sticky with respect to the economic environment; under several assumptions regarding 
a good political process efficient institutions are not implementable.
4    5 
The model proposed in this paper contributes to the literature by focusing on 
the  dynamics  of  both  formal  and  informal  aspects  of  institutional  change  and  their 
explicit and endogenous interaction with economic progress via capital accumulation. 
Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, the current study can be extended to 
endogenously  account  for  changes  in  the  power  structure,  and  hence  to  explicitly 
incorporate  the  elements  of  collective  action  and  hence  the  political  economy 
perspective.
5  
The following model considers that while informal norms and formal rules, as 
well as their enforcement characteristics, all change through time, the paces of these 
changes and the nature of their dynamics are likely to be different from each other. The 
framework  adopted  here  to  address  these  different  dynamics  follows  an  interactive 
process: as production factors change as a result of continuous technological and other 
advancements,  production  relations  at  the  basic  level  (N)  usually  adjust  to  these 
changes. However, higher organization levels that are accommodated by the prevailing 
legal structures may pose resistance to change, gradually becoming more inconsistent 
with the changing aspects of the production; F represent those aspects of production 
relations that are harder to change.
6 As a result, societies often end up with reforming 
their F’s only after growing inconsistencies between F and N eventually lead to welfare 
costs that exceed the cost of changing F. A recent example to such phenomena can be 
found  in  the  attempts  to  revise  regulatory  and  supervisory  frameworks  concerning 
financial markets in the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crises.  
A model that attempts to capture these features can be written in the framework 
of  capital  accumulation  and  technology  adoption.  Using  this  framework,  the  model 
developed  below  predicts  a  punctuated  equilibria  trajectory  for  F.  This  trajectory  is 
consistent  with  the  evolution  of  various  formal  institutions;  adoptions  of  banking  or 
competition  laws  are,  for  instance,  often  observed  to  lag  behind  the  needs  of  the 
market  and  follow  a  discontinuous  pattern  of  development.
7  Even  in  developed   6 
democracies, institutional reforms may not be realized at a socially desirable pace; as 
politicians may face resistance from special-interest groups, reforms may get delayed 
until the costs become too widespread and overwhelming.  
In what follows, Section 2 outlines a formal model, followed by calibrations that 
are presented in Section 2.1. The findings of the model are compared to the empirical 
evidence in Section 2.2. Section 3 concludes 
 
2.   The Model 
 
Consider the production function:  
 
y = A(F,N).f(k),      where A1,2′ >0 and A1,2" <0 and f′ >0 and f" <0      (1) 
 
where y stands for per capita output; k is per capita capital; A is a function that stands 
for technology, or productivity; and F and N stand for the status of formal and informal 
(norms) sets of institutions, respectively. The way the technology term A(F,N) enters 
the production function is in view of the main function of an institution: transaction cost 
reduction; an increase in institutional quality, indicated by higher values of F and N, 
implies higher total productivity or lower transaction costs.
8 F and N can be considered 
as index numbers that both range between 0 and 1 (or some upper and lower values 
such as  F < F <F  and  N < N < N ), where 1 represents the highest quality of an 
institutional attribute. Total factor productivity (A) increases in both F and N, but at a 
decreasing rate.   
Informal institutions evolve according to the process: 
 
      Nt+1 = Nt + g(kt),   where g' >0;   g״<0,     (2) 
   7 
which indicates that N progresses with the level of per capita capital, in lines with the 
endogenous growth literature. Hence the progression of N exhibits learning by doing; 
the higher the level of capital, the higher the quality or level of norms that amass with it, 
defining a higher level of technology.    
Capital per labor evolves according to: 
 
kt+1 = (1-δ) kt +It          (3) 
 
where δ is the rate of depreciation and It is the level of investment at time t.
9 Without 
loss of generality, it can be further assumed that population growth is zero and hence 
investment is equal to the savings minus depreciation allowance, such that It = syt - δkt, 
where s is the savings rate.
10 
Amending formal institutions, or changing the production technology involves 
costs, along with its projected benefits. Hence, the incumbent government chooses F 
to maximize output, net of cost of changing F. The costs may be in the form of welfare 
spending  to  compensate  for  the  displaced  economic  agents;  for  example,  the 
government may increase spending in the form of training or unemployment insurance 
to compensate for the labor that become idle due to newly adopted technologies or 
organizational structures. I argue that the extent of these costs can be related with 
mainly two structural factors; first, the cost is likely to increase with the magnitude of 
change  in  F  and,  second,  it  is  expected  to  decrease  with  the  prevailing  distance 
between  F  and  N.  The  first  of  these  arises  since  each  level  of  F  is  likely  to  be 
associated with certain special interest groups whose existence is supported by it and 
who resist its change. If, on the other hand, one considers that N is likely to represent 
the encompassing interests in a society, assuming that F is less than N, the closer is F 
to N, the less the change would be socially necessary and economically efficient, and   8 
hence the less political support there would be to change F; hence the greater is the 
cost of changing F the closer F is to N.  
In view of the above, the government’s problem can be written as:  
   
    MaxF     y - C (∆F, F/N );  where C′1 > 0 and C′2 > 0      (4) 
 
The  mechanics  of  endogenous  institutional  change  can  be  summarized  as 
follows: output and thus savings determine the level of capital accumulation which in 
turn leads N to evolve due to learning by doing. Each period the government optimally 
chooses F, facing a cost of changing it and the condition that F cannot be reduced or 
exceed N.  The model implies that while an increase in k leads N to increase and 
hence affects the optimal choice of F, F in turn affects the level of N through its affect 
on y. Hence, F and N interact continuously, as can be observed in real life examples of 
institutional change. This interaction implicitly reflects that the social cost of changing F 
hinges  upon  collective  action;  although  higher  values  of  F  may  reduce  transaction 
costs, it may not be optimal for a government to increase F when viewed from the point 
of the dynamics of outlined above. 
   The above dynamics can be summed up by the following sequential pattern:  
 
i)  Given Nt, and Ft, kt depreciates each period while new capital  
accumulates due to savings that are fully turned into investments.  
ii)  Nt+1 evolves with kt.  
iii)  Based on the levels of kt+1 and Nt+1, as well as the ratio of Ft to Nt in the 
current period, optimal Ft+1 is selected to maximize yt+1 – if optimal Ft+1 is higher 
than Ft and less than Nt+1. 
 
2.1.  Calibrations 
In order to get explicit solutions for the model and to simulate the trajectory of  
optimal F, the following expressions (5) to (8) are considered instead of the equations 
(1) to (4): 
Nt+1 = Nt + Nt 
[1/(log(k
t 
/100)]             (5)   9 
kt+1= s(Ft.Nt)
 θ β
t k + (1-δ)kt  , where 0 < s, θ , β , δ <1.
11    (6) 
 
Given (5) and (6), the government solves the following problem:  
 
MaxFt+1    (Ft+1.Nt+1)
θ β
1 + t k  - C(∆Ft, Nt+1 )         (7) 
subject to:     
C(∆Ft , Nt+1 )  = α(Ft+1- Ft)(Ft / Nt) , where α >0      (8) 
 
It is further assumed that Ft+1>Ft and Ft+1≤N t+1.   
The first order condition of the above problem yields the following optimal path 
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The solution of the problem hence satisfies Equations (5), (6) and (9).   
Figure 1 shows the calibrations of F* and k using a reasonable set of values for 
the parameters δ, β and s.
12 It is assumed that α=50 and θ=0.5, although different 
values  of  these  parameters  lead  to  similar  patterns.  In  addition,  the  initial  capital 
intensity  is  normalized  to  1.  The  figure  has  three  panels  corresponding  to  three 
different sets of initial F and N values, which are used to proxy different development 
scenarios;  to  be  able  to  solely  focus  on  the  differences  in  trajectories  arising  from 
different  initial  values  of  institutions,  the  rest  of  the  parameter  values  and  variable 
calibrations are kept constant across different scenarios.  
The first panel represents the case of developing countries that have low levels 
of  institutional  development,  with  less  than  0.5  initial  values  F  and  N;  the  second 
represents developed countries, where institutional indices are relatively high; and the 
third  also  represents  developed  countries  where  norms  are  developed  but  formal   10 
institutions are not, for which Japan may be an example with regards to some of its 
monetary and financial market institutions. To test the sensitivity of the results to the 
model  parameters,  one  can  also  choose  higher  k  and  β  values  for  the  cases  that 
represent the developed countries. Although these modifications do not change the 
general nature of the results, the first is observed to postpone the initial reform date 
and the second seem to lead to faster updates of F* once reform takes place.   
Based on Figure 1, it is easy to note that F*’s trajectory in all panels reflects a 
punctuated nature. In addition, comparison of the levels to which F* and k converge in 
all three panel indicates that convergence may be realized and poverty-trap may be 
avoided in the case of continuous institutional reforms, even when institutions are low 
quality to start with.    
Further calibrations  are performed to examine the sensitivity of  the reported 
findings to the model parameters.
13  Taking other parameters constant, it is observed 
that lower values of θ generally lead to more prolonged periods before a change in F* 
(except for N>0.5) takes place and lower steady state values. The positive effect of θ 
on  F*  is  weaker  for  the  greater  values  of  the  income  share  of  capital  (β).  The 
relationship between β and F* is also positive, though also weaker the greater is β. In 
addition, there is a negative relationship between the cost of changing F (α) and F*, 
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As the above signs indicate, the cost of changing F is not affecting the responsiveness 
of optimal-F to the income shares of technology and capital. In addition, as expected, 
the effects of α, β and θ on F* generally increase in θ and decrease in β.  
Appendix 1 shows the trajectories of optimal-F and k in relation to θ  and α. The 
graphs  reveal  that,  though  both  variables  follow  an  upward  trend  for  a  range  of  θ 
values, the cost of reform lowers these trajectories severely. Appendix 1b shows that 
increasing  the  contribution  of  F  on  productivity  (especially  for  θ  >0.8)  substantially 
increases the long term optimal capital. 
 
 
2.2.  Some Evidence 
Various examples can be given to the punctuated nature of formal institutional 
progress, including the recent emphasis on reforming global financial regulation. The 
financial crisis of 2007 revealed the necessity for F to catch up with N in the financial 
sector, where N may represent financial transactions involving the faster-developing 
financial engineering tools, and F represents the regulatory environment that needs to 
be reformed to eliminate the transaction costs related with the development in those 
tools. As Dincer and Neyapti (2007) argue, crises are among the primary causes of 
institutional change. Crises are often also observed to lead to paradigm changes in 
economics, examples  of  which can  be found in the form  of transitions from inward 
orientation  towards  outward  orientation,  or  from  a  focus  on  Keynesian  policies  to 
monetarism  that  usually  follow  major  economic  events.  While  preparing  complete 
contracts to account for all the potential risks in the economy, taking into account the 
fact  that  institutions  are  in  dynamic  interaction  with  the  rest  of  the  economic 
phenomena  is  necessary  for  understanding  economic  development.  The  recent 
proposal for incorporating behavioral aspects to modify the efficient market hypothesis,   12 
called the adaptive market hypothesis by Lo (2004), for example, provides an example 
of  the  refinements  needed  for  neoclassical  theory  to  conform  to  the  punctuated 
evolutionary path of economic institutions.  
Figures  2a  and  2b  show  sample  trajectories  of  some  well-documented 
institutional reforms, namely central bank independence (CBI) and bank regulation and 
supervision (RS). The first of these graphs demonstrates the changes in CBI in three 
formerly centrally planned economies and Chile. Figure 2b also demonstrates much 
slower changes in Brazil and the UK with regards to RS than in transition countries. 
This observation possibly arises due to existing interest group resistance to a change 
in status-quo in the former two countries as opposed to the transition countries that 
revised  their  legal  frameworks  after  severe  crises  whose  effects  were  all-
encompassing. In addition, unlike Figure 2a, the different levels or final status of RS in 
different  countries  probably  indicate  that  the  steady  state  level  of  RS  is  still  to  be 
reached  in  many  countries.  In  other  words,  comparing  the  two  graphs  seem  to 
exemplify the fact that while the central bank reforms have been achieved to a large 
extent in many countries around the world in response to the high or hyperinflationary 
episodes that caused great welfare losses during the past century, the financial and 
banking sector reforms are still in progress in many countries. 
 
 
3.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This  study  proposes  an  original  formal  model  of  endogenous  institutional  change, 
where technology is comprised of two attributes that affect productivity and transaction 
cost reduction: informal ways of conducting business or norms, and formal institutions 
that help regulate, supervise and enforce those conducts of behavior. While informal   13 
institutions  continuously  evolve  as  a  result  of  technological  know-how,  formal 
institutions change via an incumbent government’s optimizing behavior and follow a 
pattern of punctuated equilibria. Simulations of the model’s solution are consistent with 
the projected dynamics of the model as well as the evidence. 
The model is consistent with the two main strands of institutional approaches: 
transaction cost and collective action theories. The current framework can be extended 
to incorporate the political-economy aspect of institutional change explicitly, which is 
left for a future study.     14 
Figure 1:  Trajectories (50 years) of F* and k.  
     (Assuming α=50; β=0.2; δ=0.08; θ=0.5 and s=0.2) 
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Figure 2: Sample trajectories of institutional reforms: some evidence. 
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Appendix 1a:   Sample trajectories of F* and k over time and α, for given model  
parameters and initial F, N and k values (F0 , N0 and k0 , respectively). 
(F0=0.1; N0=0.5 ; k0=1 ; δ=0.08 ; s= 0.2 ; β = 0.3 ; θ=0.5 ) 
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Appendix 1b: Sample trajectories of F* and k over time and θ, for given model  
parameters and initial F, N and k values (F0 , N0 and k0 , respectively). 
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1 Coates and Heckelman (2003) and Coates et al.(2010) provide empirical evidence in support 
of Olson’s theory. Heckelman (2007) provides a review of empirical tests of Olson’s theory. 
2 See also Nabli and Nugent (1989). 
3 See, for example, Dincer and Neyapti (2008). 
4 Assumptions that define good political process are Maskin monotonicity, the consideration of 
individual preferences only, no interpersonal utility comparison, and zero monetary transfers, 
the last of which is crucial for the reported finding. 
5 The mechanism for exogenously imposed institutions, say via a lending country’s advice are 
not considered within the current framework of analysis. 
6 Workers’ security and anti-trust legislations can be considered as examples of formal 
institutions necessitated by improved technology or market structures, but they may be (or have 
been) resisted by powerful lobbies of firm owners.  
7 Competition law of Turkey, for example, was legislated several years after its proposal, and 
more than 100 years after it was put into practice in the US. 
8 Granville and Leonard (2010) provide recent empirical evidence, based on the 89 regions of 
the Russian Federation, that technology is endogenous to informal institutions. 
9 I assume full investment efficiency in the sense that all the investment spending becomes 
addition to the capital stock. 
10 Capital accumulation may also be considered to involve a shock term such that kt+1 = (1-δ) kt 
+It+ et, where a large et stands for a major leap in the capital/labor ratio due to either destruction 
of some productive forces, in instances such as war or natural disasters or as a result of major 
technological innovations.  Significant changes in the structure of production are also often 
associated with significant changes in the power structure and hence have important political 
implications. Transition from feudalism to capitalism and socialism entailed such mass 
transformations from extensive to intensive labor use and the Industrial Revolution. 
11 Calibrations yield reasonable results for θ ≤ 0.96. 
12 Nadiri and Prucha and (1995) show that the depreciation rate for physical capital is 0.06 and 
for R&D is 0.12 for the US. In addition, Mankiw et al. (1992) show that β =1/3 for US. According 
to World Development Indicators database of the World Bank, the world average of the saving 
rate (gross savings as percentage of GNI) has been between 0.20 and 0.23 during the past 
three decades. 
13 The formulas and graphs used in these calibrations are available upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 